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solely upon the complaint of a private citizen without a prior
evaluation of the citizen's complaint by the prosecuting attorney
or an investigation by the appropriate law enforcement agency.
Following such evaluation by the prosecuting attorney or
investigation by the appropriate law enforcement agency, the
prosecuting attorney shall institute all necessary and proper
proceedings before the magistrate, and, in suitable cases, law
enforcement officers may obtain warrants and assist private
citizens in obtaining the warrant or summons from the magistrate.
To the extent In re Monroe, 174 W.Va. 401, 327 S.E.2d 163
(1985), is inconsistent with our holding in this case, it is
overruled."3
IV. CRIMINAL LAW
A.

Penal and Remedial Statutes

In State ex rel. Department of Transportation, Division of Highways v.
Sommerville,' 1 Justice McHugh was called upon to determine if the state statute
regulating the weight of trucks was remedial or criminal. The court held initially
that "[w]here a statute contains provisions which are both remedial and penal, such
statute should be considered remedial when seeking to enforce the purpose for
which it was enacted, and should be considered penal when seeking to enforce the
3 2
penalty provided therein.",
Justice McHugh then said:
W.Va. Code, 17C-17-10(a) [1976] authorizes a police officer or a
member of a Division of Highways' official weighing crew to
"require the driver of any vehicle or combination of vehicles on
any highway to stop and submit such vehicle or combination of
vehicles to a weighing[,]" even where the driver refuses to
comply pursuant to W.Va. Code, 17C-17-10(c) [1976] and is thus
subject to a criminal penalty.2
Justice McHugh stated in State ex rel. Palumbo v. Graley's Body Shop,
Inc.- 4 that
[t]he question of whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is
civil or criminal is a matter of statutory construction, and requires
330
331

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
412 S.E.2d 269 (W. Va. 1991).

332

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

333

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (alteration in original).

334

425 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1992).
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the application of a two-level inquiry adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct.
2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). First, courts must determine
whether the legislature indicated, either expressly or impliedly, a
preference for labeling the statute civil or criminal. Second, if the
legislature indicates an intention to establish a civil remedy, courts
must consider whether the legislature, irrespective of its intent to
create a civil remedy, provided for sanctions so punitive as to
transform the civil remedy into a criminal penalty. As part of the
second level of the inquiry, courts should be guided by the
following factors identified by the United States Supreme Court in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct.
554, 567-68, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, 661 (1963): "Whether the sanction
involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into
play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally
be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned[.]"3
B.

ControlledSubstances

Justice McHugh pointed out in State v. Rector 86 that "[c]onstructive
possession of a controlled substance, W.Va. Code, 60A-4-401(c), and constructive
delivery or possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, W.Va. Code,
60A-4-401(a), arise from separate offenses."'' 7 The decision in Rector went on to
hold that "[it is reversible error for a trial judge to instruct a jury in a criminal trial
of a defendant charged with a marihuana violation that the defendant may be found
guilty of 'possession and delivery of a controlled substance' when such instruction
considers 'possession and delivery of a controlled substance' as a single
offense."
The question of sustaining a conviction for delivery of a controlled
substance, when nothing of value is received in return, was addressed by Justice
McHugh in State v. Ashworth.33 9 The court held initially that
[u]nder the circumstances of this criminal case, the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury that the defendant was
35

Id. at Syl. Pt 1 (alteration in original).

336

280 S.E.2d 597 (W. Va. 1981).

337

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

338

ld at Syl. Pt. 5.

339

292 S.E.2d 615 (W. Va. 1982).
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guilty of the offense of delivery of marihuana in violation of
W.Va. Code, 60A-4-401(a)(1)(ii) [1971], where the evidence
indicated that the defendant transferred the marihuana from a third
party to an undercover police officer.340
Justice McHugh concluded in Ashworth:
Where the evidence indicated that the defendant delivered
marihuana in violation of W.Va. Code, 60A-4-401(a)(1)(ii)
[1971], from a third party to an undercover police officer, a
conviction of the defendant under that statute was proper, even
though it was not shown by the evidence at trial that the defendant
received compensation, pecuniary or otherwise, with respect to the
transaction. 341
In State v. Boggess,34 2 Justice McHugh held that "[a]n instruction given to
the jury in a case involving an alleged violation of the West Virginia Uniform
Controlled Substances Act, W.Va. Code, 60A-1-101, et seq., which instruction
defined 'marihuana' by following verbatim the statutory definition of 'marihuana'
found in W.Va. Code, 60A-1-101(n) [1981], was not error. ' 3
Justice McHugh stated in State v. Nicastro34 4 that "[a]n indictment
alleging a violation of W.Va. Code, 60A-4-401(a), as amended, is sufficient to
sustain a conviction for delivery of marihuana, even though the indictment omits
stating whether the alleged offense was committed with or without
remuneration. ' ' 345 Nicastro went on to hold:
Prior to imposition of a sentence of incarceration for a defendant
convicted of delivery of less than 15 grams of marihuana in
violation of W.Va. Code, 60A-4-401(a), as amended, who,
although not within the "without remuneration" exception of
W.Va. Code, 60A-4-402(c), as amended, has no prior criminal
record, a trial court must consider: (1) whether the defendant has a
history of involvement with illegal drugs; (2) whether the
defendant is a reasonably good prospect for rehabilitation; (3)
whether incarceration would serve a useful purpose; and (4)
whether available alternatives to incarceration, such as probation
conditioned upon community service, would be more
340

Id. Syl. Pt. 3.

341

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

342

309 S.E.2d 118 (W. Va. 1983).

343

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

344

383 S.E.2d 521 (W. Va. 1989).

345

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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46

Justice McHugh addressed issues involving prosecution of health care.
providers for unlawful distribution of controlled substances in the case of State v.
Young.347 The decision held initially that
[u]nder W.Va. Code, 60A-4-401(a), as amended, which is part of
West Virginia's Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the elements
of the offense of a felonious constructive delivery of a controlled
substance by a purported prescription issued by a registered
physician, dentist or other registered practitioner are as follows:
(1) the defendant constructively delivered a controlled substance
requiring a valid prescription by the issuance of a purported
prescription on behalf of a purported patient who received the
controlled substance from a pharmacist who filled such
prescription; and
(2) the defendant issued such prescription intentionally or
knowingly outside the usual "course of professional practice
or research," thereby not engaging in the authorized activities
of a "practitioner," as defined in W.Va. Code, 60A-1-101(v),
as amended; in other words, such prescription was issued
intentionally or knowingly without a legitimate medical,
dental or other authorized purpose.m
Young indicated that
[a] count in an indictment charging that a registered practitioner
violated W.Va. Code, 60A-4-401(a), as amended, by 'knowingly,
intentionally, unlawfully and feloniously' delivering a controlled
substance by prescribing the substance even though it was 'not
necessary in the medical treatment and care' of the purported
patient sufficiently states the elements of the offense. 49
It was further stated that
W.Va. Code, 60A-5-506(a) [1971], excusing the State from having
to negate, in an indictment or at trial, any exemption or exception
under West Virginia's Uniform Controlled Substances Act, is not
applicable to a prosecution of a registered practitioner for
346

Id. at Syl. P. 6.

347

406 S.E.2d 758 (W. Va.1991).
Id. at SylPt. 1.

a4
349

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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feloniously prescribing a controlled substance in violation of
W.Va. Code, 60A-4-401(a), as amended. Therefore, an indictment
in such a prosecution must charge that the prescriptions were
issued without a legitimate medical, dental or other authorized
purpose, and the State must prove such element of the offense, as
well as all other elements of the offense, beyond a reasonable
doubt. This burden of proof includes the burden of the State, in its
case in chief, to go forward with the evidence on the lack of such
legitimate purpose for the prescriptions. 50
Justice McHugh concluded in Young that
[a] count in an indictment charging that a registered practitioner
violated W.Va. Code, 60A-4-401(a), as amended, in that he or she
merely 'delivered' a controlled substance by prescribing the
substance is fatally defective because it does not set forth all of the
essential elements of the offense, particularly the lack of a
legitimate medical, dental or other authorized purpose for the
purported prescription. 5
C.

Burglary

In State v. Ocheltree,352 Justice McHugh held that "[t]he intent to commit
a felony or any larceny is an essential element of the crime of burglary under W. Va.
Code, 61-3-11(a) [1973]. It is well settled, however, that such intent may be
inferred by the jury from the facts and circumstances of the case. ''
D.

Conspiracy

Justice McHugh was called on to expound upon the state's general
conspiracy statute in State v. Less.354 The court stated as an initial matter that
"W.Va. Code, 61-10-31(1), is a general conspiracy statute and the agreement to
commit any act which is made a felony or misdemeanor by the law of this State is a
conspiracy5 to commit an 'offense against the State' as that term is used in the
3
statute."
Justice McHugh then held in Less that "[t]he terms of W.Va. Code,
61-10-31(1), are clear and unambiguous on their face and are of sufficient
350

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

351

Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.

352

289 S.E.2d 742 (W. Va. 1982).

353

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

354

294 S.E.2d 62 (W. Va. 1981).

355

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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definiteness to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that agreeing to
commit an act made a felony or misdemeanor by the law of this State is
prohibited. ' ,356 The opinion went on to hold that "[i]n order for the State to prove a
conspiracy under W.Va. Code, 61-10-31(1), it must show that the defendant agreed
with others to commit an offense against the State and that some overt act was
taken by a member of the conspiracy to effect the object of that conspiracy. '' 57
Justice McHugh concluded in Less with the following rule of law:
Where the jury is permitted, but not required, to infer from the
evidence that the defendant had the intent necessary for
conspiracy to commit an offense against the State, and the jury is
properly and adequately advised of the State's duty to prove that
intent beyond a reasonable doubt, the giving of the instruction
"that the jury may infer that a person intends to do that which he
does, or which is the natural or necessary consequence of his act,"
is not error. 8
E.

Larceny
Justice McHugh held in State v. Riley

9

that

[a] person who is present and participating with others in the
taking of property in the commission of a larceny is chargeable
with the entire value of the goods taken, even though such person
may not have personally taken away each and every one of the
items subject to the larceny. 60
F.

Arson

Justice McHugh addressed the crime of arson in State v. Jones.361 The
court stated:
Arson in the third degree, W.Va. Code, 61-3-3 [1957], is a lesser
included offense of arson in the first degree, W.Va. Code, 61-3-1
[1935]; thus, where a criminal defendant, an inmate of a county
jail, admitted at trial that he started a fire in his cell block, and the
evidence at trial was in conflict as to whether he intended to bum
356

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

357

d. at Syl. Pt. 4.
Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.

358
359

282 S.E.2d 623 (W. Va. 1981).

360

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

361

329 S.E.2d 65 (W. Va. 1985).
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the jail within the meaning of this State's arson in the first degree
statute, W.Va. Code, 61-3-1 [1935], or intended to bum the
personal property of a fellow-inmate within the meaning of this
State's arson in the third degree statute, W.Va. Code, 61-3-3
[1957], the defendant, indicted for arson in the first degree, was
entitled to an instruction upon arson in the third degree, as a lesser
included offense under the indictment. 6 2
Justice McHugh addressed several issues involving arson in State v.
Mullins.3 It was noted initially that "[a]n indictment for a charge of first degree
arson is sufficient to sustain a conviction if, in charging the offense, it makes
reference to W.Va. Code, 61-3-1, as amended, and fully informs the defendant of
the particular offense with which the defendant is charged. '' 3 64 The opinion held
that "[a] building which contains an apartment, intended for habitation, whether
occupied, unoccupied or vacant, is a 'dwelling house' for purposes of W.Va. Code,
61-3-1, as amended., 365 Mullins stated that "[t]o sustain a conviction of arson,
when the evidence offered at trial is circumstantial, the evidence must show that the
fire was of an incendiary origin36and
the defendant must be connected with the
6
actual commission of the crime."
G.

Criminal Child Abuse and Neglect

Justice McHugh was called to address issues involving the criminal abuse
and neglect statute in the case of State v. DeBerry.367 Justice McHugh held that
[ijn order to obtain a conviction under W.Va. Code, 61-8D-4(b)
[1988], the State must prove that the defendant neglected a minor
child within the meaning of the term "neglect," as that term is
defined by W.Va. Code, 61-8D-1(6) [1988], which definition is
"the unreasonable failure by a parent, guardian, or any person
voluntarily accepting a supervisory role towards a minor child to
exercise a minimum degree of care to assure said minor child's
physical safety or health." Furthermore, the State must prove that
such neglect caused serious bodily injury. However, there is no
requirement to prove criminal intent in a prosecution under W. Va.

362

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

363

383 S.E.2d 47 (W. Va. 1989).

364

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

365

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

366

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

367

408 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 1991).
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Code, 61-8D-4(b) [1988].368
H.

CriminalHuntingAccident

In State v. Ivey, 369 Justice McHugh set out the elements for the offense of
causing harm while hunting. The court held that
[u]nder W.Va. Code, 20-2-57 [1991], it is unlawful for any person,
while engaged in hunting, pursuing, taking or killing wild animals
or wild birds, to act with ordinary carelessness or ordinary
negligence in shooting, wounding or killing any human being or
livestock, or in destroying or injuring any other chattels or
property. Any person violating W.Va. Code, 20-2-57 [1991] is
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than ten
thousand dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail not more than
one year, or both fined and imprisoned. 7 0
L

Criminal Trespass

Justice McHugh held in State v. Ocheltree3 71 that "[c]riminal trespass, as
defined by W.Va. Code, 61-3B-2 [1978], is not a lesser included offense of burglary
by breaking and entering, as defined by W.Va. Code, 61-3-11(a) [1973]. ''372
J.

Trafficking in Stolen Goods

In State v. Hall,37 3 Justice McHugh set out the elements of the offense of
trafficking in stolen goods. The court stated that
[t]he essential elements of the offense created by W.Va. Code,
61-3-18 [1931] are: (1) The property must have been previously
stolen by some person other than the defendant; (2) the accused
must have bought or received the property from another person or
must have aided in concealing it; (3) he must have known, or had
reason to believe, when he bought or received or aided in
concealing the property, that it had been stolen; and (4) he must
have bought or received or aided in concealing the property with a
368

Id at Syl. Pt. 1.

369

474 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1996).
Id. at Syl. PL 3.

370
371
372
373

289 S.E.2d 742 (W. Va. 1982).
Id at Syl. Pt. 2.
298 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1982).
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dishonest purpose.374
The opinion in Hall also held that
[u]nder the provisions of W.Va. Code, 61-3-18 [1931] where the
State proves that a defendant received or aided in the concealment
of property which was stolen from different owners on different
occasions, but does not prove that the defendant received or aided
in the concealment of the property at different times or different
places then such defendant may be convicted of only one offense
of receiving or aiding in the concealment of stolen property. 375
K.

CarryingDeadly Weapon Without License
Justice McHugh ruled in State v. Hodges376 that

[t]he absence of a license is an element of the crime of carrying a
dangerous or deadly weapon without a license and the burden of
proof as to this element must be borne by the State. To the extent
it diverges from this opinion, State v. Merico, 77 W.Va. 314, 87
S.E. 370 (1913) is hereby overruled. 3r
In Cline v. Murensky3 78 Justice McHugh addressed two issues involving
the offense of carrying a deadly weapon without a license. The court first held:
Where in magistrate court a petitioner was charged with and
entered a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor offense of brandishing
a weapon, W.Va. Code, 61-7-10 [1925], the State was not
precluded from subsequently seeking an indictment and
prosecuting that petitioner for the misdemeanor offense of
carrying a weapon without a license, W.Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975],
where, although those two offenses arose from the same criminal
transaction, the plea of guilty to brandishing a weapon was taken
in magistrate court shortly after the offenses were committed, and
prior to the taking of that plea, the prosecuting attorney had no
knowledge of or opportunity to attend that magistrate court

374

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

375

Id. at Syl. Pt. 9.
305 S.E.2d 278 (W. Va. 1983).

376

377
378

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
322 S.E.2d 702 (W. Va. 1984).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 8
A TRIBUTE TO THOMAS E. McHUGH

Special)
proceeding.3

79

The court next held in Cline that "[t]he statutory offenses of brandishing a
weapon, W.Va. Code, 61-7-10 [1925], and carrying a weapon without a license,
W.Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975], even when arising from a single criminal transaction,
do not constitute the 'same offense' under constitutional prohibitions against
double jeopardy."380
The determination of whether an instrument is dangerous or deadly was
examined by Justice McHugh in State v. Choat.8' The court stated:
When the instrument involved in a prosecution under W.Va.
Code, 61-7-1 [1975] is not one specifically enumerated in the
statute, the issue as to whether it is a "dangerous or deadly
weapon" is essentially a factual determination and must be
submitted to the jury, unless the trial court can determine as a
matter of law that under the evidence in the case the jury could not
have concluded that the weapon was dangerous or deadly. To the
extent that this Court's holding in Village of Barboursville ex rel.
Bates v. Taylor, 115 W.Va. 4, 174 S.E. 485 (1934), is inconsistent
with this opinion, it is hereby overruled. 8 2
L.

Worthless Check Offenses

In State v. Haysm Justice McHugh addressed issues involving the crimes
of obtaining property for worthless checks and issuing worthless checks. It was
held initially that "W.Va. Code, 61-3-39 [1977] and W.Va. Code, 61-3-39a [1977]
are not unconstitutionally vague in violation of U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Sec. 1, or
W.Va. Const. art.III, Sec. 10."'384 Hays also held that
[a] violation of W.Va. Code, 61-3-39a [1977] is not a lesser
included offense of W.Va. Code, 61-3-39 [1977]. Consequently, a
defendant who is accused of violating W.Va. Code, 61-3-39
[1977] is not entitled to a 'lesser included offense' instruction
reflecting the elements of W.Va. Code, 61-3-39a [1977].385

379

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

380

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

381

363 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1987).

382

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

383

408 S.E.2d 614 (W. Va. 1991).

384

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

385

Id at Syl. Pt. 5.
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FirstDegreeMurder

Justice McHugh held in State v. Kopa 38 6 that
[i]t is the mandatory duty of the trial court to instruct the jury that
it may add a recommendation of mercy to a verdict of murder of
the first degree and such duty shall be fulfilled by the trial court
over the objection of the defendant unless it affirmatively appears
from the record that the defendant understands the consequences
of his action.38
In State v. Phillips, 388 Justice McHugh said that "[i]f, on a trial for murder,
the evidence is wholly circumstantial, but as to time, place, motive, means, and
conduct it concurs in pointing to 389
the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, he [or
convicted.,
be
properly
may
she]
Issues involving murder by lying-in-wait were presented to Justice
McHugh in State v. Harper.390 He said:
"Lying in wait" as a legal concept has both mental and physical
elements. The mental element is the purpose or intent to kill or
inflict bodily harm upon someone; the physical elements consist
of waiting, watching and secrecy or concealment. In order to
sustain a conviction for first degree murder by lying in wait
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 61-2-1 [1987], the prosecution must
prove that the accused was waiting and watching with
concealment or secrecy for the purpose of or with the intent to kill
or inflict bodily harm upon a person.391
Harperconcluded that
[w]here, in the prosecution of first degree murder by lying in wait,
there is sufficient evidence before the trial court that the defendant
was unaware that the principal in the first degree was preparing to
kill or inflict bodily harm upon the victim, the trial court should
also instruct the jury on the offense of second degree murder if the

386

311 S.E.2d 412 (W. Va. 1983).

387

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

388

342 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1986).

389

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4 (alteration in original).

390

365 S.E.2d 69 (W. Va. 1987).

391

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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392
elements of that offense are present.

Justice McHugh addressed the issue of establishing the corpus delicti
based upon a confession in the case of State v. Garrett.93 The court held:
The corpus delicti may not be established solely with an accused's
The confession or
extrajudicial confession or admission.
admission must be corroborated in a material and substantial
manner by independent evidence. The corroborating evidence
need not of itself be conclusive but, rather, is sufficient if, when
taken in connection with the confession3 94or admission, the crime is
established beyond a reasonable doubt.
N.

Perjuryand FalseSwearing
Justice McHugh held in State v. Wade 95* that
[a] "lawfully administered" oath or affirmation is an essential
element of the crimes of perjury, W.Va. Code, 61-5-1 [1931], and
false swearing, W.Va. Code, 61-5-2 [1931]; and a "lawfully
administered" oath or affirmation, as that phrase is used in W.Va.
Code, 61-5-1 [1931], and W.Va. Code, 61-5-2 [1931], is an oath or
affirmation authorized by law and taken before or administered by
a tribunal, officer or person authorized by law to administer such
oaths or affirmations.396

0.

Kidnapping

Justice McHugh was asked in State v. Brumfield 97 whether incidental
confinement of a correction officer by an escaping inmate constituted kidnaping.
The court held:
Where an inmate, by force, has unlawfully confined a correctional
officer for a minimal period of time within the walls of a
correctional facility in order to facilitate his escape, and
movement of that officer was slight and did not result in exposure
to an increased risk of harm, a conviction for the offense of
392

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

393

466 S.E.2d 481 (W. Va. 1995).

394

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

395
396

174 W.Va. 381 (W. Va. 1985).
Id at Syl. Pt. 1.

397

358 S.E.2d 801 (W. Va. 1987).
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kidnaping pursuant to W.Va. Code, 61-2-14a [1965] will be
reversed where the confinement was incidental to the escape and
the inmate has not utilized the officer as a hostage nor as a shield
to protect that inmate or others from bodily harm or capture or
arrest after that inmate or others have committed a crime.3 98
P.

Driving Under the Influence

In State ex rel. Crank v. City of Logan,399 Justice McHugh had to
determine whether municipalities could create DUI ordinances that carried
penalties that were less than that which was provided by statute. He held that
" [p]ursuant to W.Va. Code, 17C-5- 11(b), as amended, a municipal ordinance must
impose the same penalty for driving 40under
the influence of alcohol as is prescribed
0
for the corresponding state offense.,
Q.

Forgery

The case of State v. Phalen4 1 involved prosecution for the crime of
forgery. Justice McHugh wrote that
[i]t is a jury question as to whether the requisite intent to commit
forgery, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 61-4-5 [1961], is present when a
person who has given a false name later admits the name given
was false. Additionally, a jury may find that giving a false name
on a police fingerprint card constitutes forgery since the act
prejudices the legal rights of the State by frustrating the State's
authority to administer justice. 0 2
R.

Application of Habitual Offender Statute

At issue in Justice v. Hedrick 40 3 was the use of an out-of-state conviction to
enhance the punishment of the defendant's in-state conviction. Justice McHugh
wrote that "[w]here a defendant has been convicted of a crime in another
jurisdiction, which defendant in West Virginia would have been treated as a
juvenile offender, such prior conviction may not be used in subsequent West
Virginia proceedings to enhance the defendant's sentence pursuant to the West

398

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

399

363 S.E.2d 135 (W. Va. 1987).

400

Id. at Syl.

401

452 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1994).

402

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

403

350 S.E.2d 565 (W. Va. 1986).
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Special)

Virginia Habitual Criminal Statute. ' 404
He concluded the opinion stating that "[w]hether the conviction of a crime
outside of West Virginia may be the basis for application of the West Virginia
Habitual Criminal Statute, W.Va. Code,40561-11-18, -19 [1943], depends upon the
classification of that crime in this State.

S.

CollateralEstoppel

40 6 Justice McHugh
In the case of State v. Porter,
held that "[t]he principle
of collateral estoppel applies in a criminal case where an issue of ultimate fact has
once been determined by a valid and final judgment. In such
case, that issue may
407
not again be litigated between the State and the defendant.,

V. CIVIL PROCEDURE

A.

Motion to Dismiss

Relying on the decision in Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co.,40 8 Justice
McHugh held in Dunlap v. Hinkle40 9 that "[t]he trial court, in appraising the
sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, should not dismiss the
complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff41can
prove no set of facts
0
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
B.

Summary Judgment

Justice McHugh took the opportunity in Brown v. Bluefield Municipal
Building Commission41' to restate a rule of law fashioned in Masinter v. Webco
Co.4 12 The court in Brown held that "[e]ven if the trial judge is of the opinion to
direct a verdict, he should nevertheless ordinarily hear evidence and, upon a trial,
direct a verdict
rather than try the case in advance on a motion for summary
413
judgment.

404

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

405

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

406
407

392 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1990).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

408

236 S.E.2d 207 (W. Va. 1977).

409

317 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1984).

410

Id. at Syl. Pt 2.

411

280 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va. 1981).

412

262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980).

413

280 S.E.2d at Syl.
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